

27 Aug 01

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Aerospace Basic Course (AETC)  
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112

LESSON PLAN

**A3010, THEORY, DOCTRINE, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGY**

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**RECORD OF CHANGES**

CHANGE NUMBER	REMARKS
New Lesson Plan	Supercedes ABC lesson 1210 dated 7 Aug 00

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES**



## **EDUCATIONAL GOALS**

A3000 Area Objective: Comprehend the significance of aerospace history and doctrine to modern warfare.

### **A3010 - THEORY, DOCTRINE, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGY**

**Lesson Objective 1:** Know the contextual elements and operational art elements of warfare.

#### **Samples of Behavior:**

(R/S) 1.1 - State the definitions of contextual elements and operational art elements.

(R/S) 1.2 - Distinguish between examples of contextual elements and operational art elements.

**Lesson Objective 2:** Know the definitions of theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy.

#### **Samples of Behavior:**

(R/S) 2.1 - State the definition of theory.

(R/S) 2.2 - State the definition of doctrine.

(R/S) 2.3 - State the definition of objectives.

(R/S) 2.4 - State the definition of strategy.

**Lesson Objective 3:** Comprehend the relationships among theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy.

#### **Samples of Behavior:**

(R/S) 3.1 - Summarize the relationships among theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy.

(R/S) 3.2 - Distinguish between examples of theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy.

**Lesson Objective 4:** Know how objectives and strategy developed at the strategic level affect objectives and strategy developed at the theater/operational level and the tactical level.

**Sample of Behavior:**

(R/S) 4.1 - State the process through which objectives and strategy developed at the strategic level affect objectives and strategy developed at the theater/operational level and the tactical level.

**Lesson Description:** This lesson introduces students to the concepts of theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy, as well as the contextual elements and operational art elements of warfare. This lesson also explains how objectives and strategy progress from the strategic level, through the theater/operational level, to the tactical level. Students demonstrate their comprehension of these concepts through class discussion.

**Prerequisites:** A5010, Conflict

**Preparation:** Read AFDD 1--Forward, Introduction, pp. 1-6, and Epilogue.  
Read A3010, Theory, Doctrine, Objectives, and Strategy.

**Optional:** N/A

**Rationale/Linkage:** This lesson introduces students to the Military Studies area of instruction. ABC's overview of aerospace history, theory, and doctrine begins in A3020, Origin and Theory of Airpower. Students can use ABC's aerospace history lessons as reference points to illustrate how military theory is based on historical experience and analysis. This lesson introduces that concept. Understanding how military theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy are developed is key to understanding how we fight. Once students grasp these concepts, they should better understand how operational plans are developed and how the Air Force employs aerospace power to achieve national objectives.

## INSTRUCTIONAL PLAN

1. **TITLE AND LENGTH OF SEMINAR:** Theory, Doctrine, Objectives and Strategy (1:00)
2. **RELATION TO OTHER INSTRUCTION:** This lesson introduces students to the Military Studies area of instruction. ABC's overview of aerospace history, theory, and doctrine begins in A3020, Origin and Theory of Airpower. Students can use ABC's aerospace history lessons as reference points to illustrate how military theory is based on historical experience and analysis. This lesson introduces that concept. Understanding how military theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy are developed is key to understanding how we fight. Once students grasp these concepts, they should better understand how operational plans are developed and how the Air Force employs aerospace power to achieve national objectives. For example, as students study and analyze aerospace history, they will actually be participating in the process of developing future military theories and doctrine.

3. **GENERAL METHOD OF INSTRUCTION:**

- a. **Presentation Method:** Guided Discussion

- b. **Time Outline:**

Segment Time	Total Time	Description
0:05	(0:05)	Introduction
0:10	(0:15)	MP I: Contextual and Operational Art Elements
0:10	(0:25)	MP II: Theory
0:10	(0:35)	MP III: Doctrine
0:10	(0:45)	MP IV: Objectives and Strategy
0:10	(0:55)	MP V: Exercise
0:05	(1:00)	Conclusion

- c. **Instructor Preparation:**

- Review the lesson plan.
- Read AFDD 1--Forward, Introduction, pp. 1-6, and Epilogue.
- Read A3010, Theory, Doctrine, Objectives, and Strategy.

- Read “Aerospace Doctrine: More Than Just a Theory” by Gen Ronald R. Fogleman.
- Read the Preface of the National Security Strategy.
- Read the Executive Summary of the National Military Strategy.

**d. Instructional Aids/Handouts:**

- Slides
- 3010-HO-1, Theory, Doctrine, Objectives, and Strategy Exercise
- 3010-A-1, Theory, Doctrine, Objectives, and Strategy Exercise Answer Sheet
- Video: The Bombardier, which depicts a WWII bombing competition.

**e. Student Preparation:**

- Read AFDD 1--Forward, Introduction, pp. 1-6, and Epilogue.
- Read A3010, Theory, Doctrine, Objectives, and Strategy.

**f. Strategy:** This lesson introduces the concepts of military theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy. It is intended as a general introduction to ensure students understand these concepts. These concepts will be used throughout the course, so it's important to learn them here. The guided discussion will help the instructor measure how well students understand these concepts, as does the handout exercise: The handout (A3010-HO-1) includes four paragraphs, each of which represent either theory, doctrine, objective, or strategy. Students might debate the “right” answers. Allow the debate. Be sure that students can support their viewpoints with sound reasoning. Judge by student responses whether they comprehend the material. Remind them that “debates” over theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy are continuous and happen at every level of the Air Force. More to the point, explain that ABC’s overview of aerospace history, theory, and doctrine begins in A3020, Origin and Theory of Airpower. Tell students they can use ABC’s aerospace history lessons as reference points to illustrate how military theory is based on historical experience and analysis. Impress upon students that as they study and analyze aerospace history, they will actually be participating in the process of developing future military theories and doctrine.


**g. References:** N/A

## 4. DETAILS OF INSTRUCTION:

### a. Introduction: 0:05 (0:05)

1) //Attention//

[SLIDE]



*{Instructor Note: Select one of the following two Attention steps.}*

*{(1) Attention step #1: Discussion of personal “lessons learned”:.}*

I hope most of us are like Lt Catcha Klue in the readings for this lesson – I hope we improve how we live based on our experiences. All of us have learned lessons. Somebody share with us a lesson you’ve learned through “life’s school of hard knocks.”

*{Instructor note: Have one of your own “lessons learned” prepared, in case students hesitate to participate. Another idea is to actually start the class with an interesting tale about a lesson you learned. The idea here is to get students into the mode of thinking about learning from one’s experiences and history, the way the Air Force does.}*

Let’s face it: We all make mistakes, have lapses in judgment, or just don’t do things as wisely as possible. It’s important that we learn from those experiences.

*{(2) Attention step #2: Video: The Bombardier:.}*

This video deals with debates over theory, doctrine, and strategy. It demonstrates the process you will learn in this lesson: Before the US entered WWII, the Army Air Corps debated several theories of aerospace power. The debates resulted in Army Air Corps doctrine, which in turn resulted in strategies for weapon system procurement and aircrew training. Some factions, notably the Air Corps Tactical


School, promoted the theory of Daytime High-Altitude Precision Bombing, but they had a great deal of trouble getting these theories approved as Army Air Corps doctrine. Then, in 1939, the Germans conquered Poland using Blitzkrieg dive-bombing tactics. As you will see, some Army Air Corps officers believed this historical data reinforced the current Air Corps doctrine of dive-bombing. They wanted to pursue a strategy of increasing emphasis on dive-bombing in weapon system procurement and aircrew training. But based on the development of improved technology--the Norden bombsight-- the proponents of Daytime High-Altitude Precision Bombing challenged a dive-bomber to a bombing competition. Let's see what happens!

### [Video]

This competition paved the way to further development of theory of Daytime High-Altitude Precision Bombing. It also led to the US strategy of further development of the B-17 Flying Fortress. Furthermore, it's interesting to note that in 1940, the Germans lost the Battle of Britain because of their earlier reliance on the Blitzkrieg strategy: The objectives for the Battle of Britain were different from those for the attack on Poland. In order to win the Battle of Britain, the Germans needed a heavy bomber like the B-17, but they hadn't developed a heavy bomber fleet because their earlier strategy was to develop an air force suited to the Blitzkrieg strategy. So, you can see how important it is to understand theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy!

2) //Motivation//

### [SLIDE]



The same is true for the military. Just as individuals make decisions based on past experiences, so does the military. In fact, some people occupy a lot of their time studying past military experiences to try to better understand how war "works."




Sun Tzu was one of those people. In The Art of War, he said, **“War is a matter of vital importance to the State, the province of life or death, the road to survival or ruin. It is therefore mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”**

That statement was written 2,500 years ago, but it’s still important today to study war and make intelligent guesses about future warfare. Based on the human history, we can safely say that conflict is inevitable. Therefore, we need to try to “figure it out” as well as we can and prepare ourselves better for future wars. There are other reasons that we study theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy at ABC. One of them is that we are warriors, by virtue of our association with the Air Force. And because we’re also *officers*, we are considered *professional* warriors, and professionals should study and continuously learn about their profession. One other reason that you need to “study” war is that you and your peers will be developing theory, doctrine, and strategy for tomorrow’s aerospace force.

3) //Overview//

[SLIDE]



We’ll begin by discussing contextual elements and operational art elements. Then we’ll define theory, doctrine, objectives and strategy. We’ll also spend some time discussing reasons why theories change, and how objectives and strategies are transmitted from the national level down to the battlefield level. After we’ve talked about those concepts for a few minutes, I’ll give you a short “exercise” that should help clarify the differences between theory, doctrine, objectives and strategy.

(TRANSITION): LET’S START BY CLARIFYING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS AND OPERATIONAL ART ELEMENTS.

**b. MP I: Contextual and Operational Art Elements: 0:10 (0:15)**

[SLIDE]



**LEAD OFF QUESTION (LOQ): BASED ON YOUR READING, WHAT ARE “CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS,” AND WHAT ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF THEM?**

**ANTICIPATED RESPONSES (AR):**

- Contextual elements are outside influences that the planner, commander or theorist cannot control
  - **[BUILD]** Examples: Politics, international relations, economics, leadership and environment

**FOLLOW UP QUESTION (FUQ): WHAT ARE “OPERATIONAL ART” ELEMENTS, AND WHAT ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF THEM?**

**AR:**

- Operational art elements are influences over which the planner, commander or theorist has some degree of control
  - **[BUILD]** Examples: Logistics, technology, information, deception, targeting science, measuring success

**FUQ: WHY DO YOU THINK MILITARY PLANNERS AND COMMANDERS CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS AND OPERATIONAL ART ELEMENTS?**

**AR:**

- The military doesn’t live in a vacuum
- The military is only one part of the “picture”
- Issues such as economics and international relations will certainly influence how the military operates

- The military is an “extension” of politics, according to theorists like Clausewitz--so, international politics certainly influences the military

*{Instructor Note: Tell your flight that they will be performing as military planners throughout ABC--in AFEX, AIRGAP, and Blue Thunder.}*

(INTERNAL TRANSITION): LET’S LOOK AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE GULF WAR AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS CAN INFLUENCE A MILITARY OPERATION.

**FUQ: MILITARILY, THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WERE DEFEATED AND ON THE RUN. GIVEN OUR TREMENDOUS ADVANTAGE, WHAT KEPT US FROM DESTROYING THE RETREATING REPUBLICAN GUARD UNITS?**

**AR:**

- Overriding political considerations resulted in a unilateral cease-fire
- International relations suggested that the United States might not be able to hold the fragile coalition together or retain American public support if it were to go beyond the United Nations mandate. The abrupt cease-fire prevented land and air forces from surrounding and cutting off retreating Republican Guard units


**INTERIM SUMMARY (Instructor Note):**

1. Include students’ ideas that support main points.
2. Add new information as necessary.
3. Reinforce key elements that will be needed throughout the lesson.

(TRANSITION): AS THE MILITARY DEVELOPS THEORY AND DOCTRINE, WE HAVE TO CONSIDER CONTEXTUAL AND OPERATIONAL ART ELEMENTS. DOING SO HELPS COMMANDERS ANTICIPATE THEIR EFFECTS ON THE BATTLE PLAN. YOU’LL HEAR MORE ABOUT CONTEXTUAL AND OPERATIONAL ART ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE COURSE. NOW, LET’S CONSIDER THEORY, DOCTRINE, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGY.

**c. MP II: Theory: 0:10 (0:25)**

**[SLIDE]**



**LOQ: TO BEGIN, WHAT IS “THEORY”--NOT THE MILITARY DEFINITION, BUT WHAT IS A THEORY, BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCES?**

**AR:**

- An educated guess
- Hypothesis
- Analysis of a set of facts in their relation to one another
- Abstract thought
- Speculation
- Hypothetical set of principles

**FUQ: WHAT ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF NON-MILITARY THEORIES?**

**AR:**

- Evolution
- Creationism
- Theory that it's best to be prepared before coming to class
- Theory that one should do research before making a major purchase, such as a car, house or appliance
- Theory that it's better to train for a marathon before running a marathon

**FUQ: WHAT ARE SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THEORIES?**

**AR:**

- Can't always be “proven”
- Rely on observation
- Rely on historical analysis
- Rely on evidence
- Rely on assumptions
- Are debatable

**FUQ: IN YOUR OWN WORDS, WHAT’S THE DEFINITION OF “MILITARY THEORY,” AS PRESENTED IN THE READINGS?**

**AR:**

- [BUILD] Knowledge, based on historical experience and assumptions, used to analyze, predict and explain the nature and/or behavior of war
- “Theory” comes from the Greek words theoros, theasthai, and thea, meaning “spectator,” “to observe,” and “a viewing,” respectively
- “Theory” has the same root as the word “theater”

**FUQ: WHAT MIGHT BE SOME MILITARY THEORIES?**

**AR:**

*{Instructor Note: Encourage brainstorming--don’t criticize or over-analyze ideas prematurely.}*

- The force with the element of surprise has the advantage
- It’s best to hit an enemy hard and early
- It’s best to hit an enemy light at the beginning, and then increase the pressure gradually to encourage the enemy to “give up”
- Know your enemy, know yourself, and in a hundred battles you won’t be defeated--(a paraphrase of Sun Tzu)

**FUQ: YOUR READING SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY THEORY SERVES AT LEAST THREE PURPOSES. WHAT ARE THOSE PURPOSES, AND WHY DO YOU THINK THOSE PURPOSE ARE OR ARE NOT IMPORTANT?**

**AR:**

- Theory serves as a basis for historical study
- Theory, as Clausewitz stated, trains the mind of the commander
- Theory clarifies the “normal” pattern of war

**FUQ: EXPLAIN WHAT’S MEANT BY A “NORMAL” PATTERN OF WAR.**

**AR:**

- Wars are bloody
- Wars are often “irrational”
- Wars are used to try to force one party to submit to the wishes of another
- Wars are typically an extension of politics

**FUQ: EXPLAIN THREE REASONS WHY THEORIES CHANGE. CITE A HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF EACH.**

**AR:**

- **Catastrophe**: Example: Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This catastrophe demonstrated the vulnerability of surface vessels to aircraft, and the focus of naval warfare soon shifted from the battleship to the aircraft carrier
- **Technological developments**: Example: The development of the diesel engine, which made deep-sea submarines a reality, changing naval warfare
  - Another example: Stealth, precision navigation, and information technologies have changed the way we think about conflict
- **Socio-political or economic changes**: Example: The shift from an agrarian to an industrial society, or the shift from an industry-based to an information-based society


**INTERIM SUMMARY (Instructor Note):**

1. Include students’ ideas that support main points.
2. Add new information as necessary.
3. Reinforce key elements that will be needed throughout the lesson.

(TRANSITION): NOW THAT WE BETTER UNDERSTAND WHAT “THEORY” IS, LET’S TURN OUR ATTENTION TO DOCTRINE.

**d. MP III: Doctrine: 0:10 (0:35)**

**[SLIDE]**



General Curtis LeMay said, “**At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. . . . It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment.**”

## **LOQ: WHAT IS “AIR FORCE DOCTRINE”?**

### **AR:**

- Statement of officially-sanctioned beliefs and warfighting principles that describes and guides the proper use of air and space forces in military operations
- It is what we have come to understand based on our experience, which may include actual combat or contingency operations as well as equipment tests or exercises

[SLIDE]



## **FUQ: WHAT ARE SOME PUBLISHED EXAMPLES OF AIR FORCE DOCTRINE?**

### **AR:**

- Air Force Doctrine Documents 1 and 2

## **FUQ: WHY DO YOU THINK IT IS OR ISN'T IMPORTANT FOR THE MILITARY TO HAVE “OFFICIAL” DOCTRINE?**

### **AR:**

- Of course, **it's important**: It puts us all “on the same sheet of music”
- It helps the entire force focus on how it does its business
- Since doctrine is constantly evolving, doctrine encourages creative and independent thinking among military professionals, as they think of ways to improve themselves, their Service, and the Joint force

- The more military professionals share a common baseline of knowledge about the profession of war, and the better that baseline is, the more we can work effectively to achieve common objectives without wasted effort

**FUQ: WHY IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE A CONTINUOUS PROCESS?**

**AR:**

- Doctrine is constantly changing as new experiences and advances in technology point the way to the force of the future

**FUQ: DO YOU THINK IT'S NECESSARY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE TO BE A CONTINUOUS PROCESS? WHY CAN'T WE SIMPLY LEAVE AFDD 1 AND 2 THE WAY THEY ARE, WITH NO PLANS TO "UPDATE" THEM?**

**AR:**

- We would get stagnant
- As we develop new technologies and have new experiences, we have to update our doctrine to prevent ourselves from becoming lax
- We need to continually update our thinking

**FUQ: WHAT ARE SOME HISTORICAL EXAMPLES THAT ILLUSTRATE WHEN DOCTRINE BECAME STAGNANT?**

**AR:**

- Responses will vary

*{Instructor Note: For your reference, here are four historical instances of stagnant or outdated doctrine:}*

**INSTRUCTOR EXAMPLE 1:** A classic example of stagnation is the case of France in the 1930s. The French thought they learned the right lesson from the history of World War I: Offensive operations were too expensive in national treasure--especially lives--and a strong defense was the key to victory. Fearing a future attack by Germany, they decided on a doctrine of defense: They built a series of forts, called the Maginot Line, along their common border. Designed to delay a German attack long enough to bring up reinforcements, it was the most sophisticated defensive system in the world. Unfortunately, the French ignored the



subsequent theoretical advances made in maneuver warfare (mainly through the writings of two British authors), while the Germans did not. When the Germans did attack, they simply drove around the static defenses and through the hilly, forested Ardennes region (which the French believed impassable to armored vehicles), rendering the fortifications virtually useless. Why did the French fail? They forgot to reevaluate their doctrine based on the enemy's possible reaction to it. Remember: The enemy is a living, thinking being!

**INSTRUCTOR EXAMPLE 2:** During the early years of WWII, an unwavering adherence to the pre-war doctrine that formations of bombers could defend themselves against enemy fighters resulted in heavy losses. In just four missions during October 1943, the Eighth Air Force lost 30 percent of its operational aircraft and 35 percent of its combat crews. These huge losses finally forced the delay of unescorted missions until the fielding of long-range fighters to accompany the bombers.

**INSTRUCTOR EXAMPLE 3:** In the 1950s, air-to-air missiles were developed to counter the threat of Soviet bombers. Believing in the technological superiority of this new weapon, the F-4 Phantom was originally designed without an internal gun and relied exclusively on missiles. Later combat in Vietnam revealed that agile MiG-21s could outmaneuver the missiles. When combined with rules of engagement that required aircrews to identify targets visually, our pilots were at a disadvantage during close-in combat. We quickly scrambled to fit a gun into the F-4. Our doctrine at the time was developed based on our technical capabilities and the perceived threat.

**INSTRUCTOR EXAMPLE 4:** Operation BOLO (2 January 1967, Vietnam War): Air doctrine in this era was largely dedicated to nuclear combat, and this doctrine largely guided strategies for weapon system development and aircrew training. Therefore, when faced with the challenge of the different kind of combat encountered in Vietnam, US forces weren't adequately trained and equipped, and suffered heavy losses. The bomber of choice was the F-105 Thunderchief (or, "Thud"), which was not very maneuverable when fully loaded with bombs. The Thuds were forced to jettison their bomb loads when attacked by MiG-21s operating from North Vietnamese airfields which President Johnson had not yet permitted to be struck. So, even if not shot down (as many were), the F-105s failed to carry out their mission. Those same MiG-21s were careful to avoid F-4 Phantoms, which were faster and more maneuverable than F-105s.

North Vietnamese ground controllers got used to scrambling MiG-21s whenever they received jamming signals from pods carried by F-105s. These pods

protected the Thud from surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). For Operation BOLO, the pods were installed on F-4s. On 2 Jan 67, the F-4s flew north with these pods, fooling ground controllers into believing they were F-105s. MiG-21s were no match for the F-4s, and in the ensuing 9-minute air battle, the F-4s shot down 7 of the 32 scrambled MiGs. Operation BOLO was the first time the Air Force managed to shoot down more than 2 enemy aircraft in the same day over Vietnam.

Using new theories developed from combat experience, we had succeeded in developing new tactics to overcome the handicap of a stagnant point of our doctrine.

## **FUQ: SO FAR, WE'VE TALKED ABOUT THEORY AND DOCTRINE. HOW DO THEORY AND DOCTRINE DIFFER? HOW ARE THEY RELATED?**

### **AR:**

- **Theory** is knowledge based on the study and analysis of experience, whereas **doctrine** is the officially sanctioned beliefs that evolve from theory

### **INTERIM SUMMARY (Instructor Note):**

1. Include students' ideas that support main points.
2. Add new information as necessary.
3. Reinforce key elements that will be needed throughout the lesson.

(TRANSITION): OF THEORY, DOCTRINE, OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY, THEORY IS THE MOST ABSTRACT, AND THEREFORE THE MOST DIFFICULT TO "PIN DOWN." DOCTRINE IS MORE CONCRETE, BUT WE GET EVEN MORE CONCRETE WITH OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY.

### **e. MP IV: Objectives and Strategy: 0:10 (0:45)**

### **[SLIDE]**



## LOQ: LET'S START WITH OBJECTIVES. WHAT ARE "OBJECTIVES"?

AR:


- A specific statement of a desired end
- [BUILD] The “what” that we want to achieve, expressed in specific terms

## FUQ: WHAT DO YOU THINK MIGHT MAKE OBJECTIVES PARTICULARLY STRONG OR WEAK?

AR:

- Objectives are “strong” if they’re specific, concrete, concise, measurable, attainable, and unchanging
- Objectives are “weak” if they’re ambiguous, lengthy, unattainable, or frequently changing

[SLIDE]



## FUQ: YOU KNOW THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS “WHAT” WE WANT TO ACCOMPLISH. WHAT IS STRATEGY?

AR:

- [BUILD] Strategy is how we plan to meet the objectives
- Strategy answers the question, “How are we going to do what we want to do?”
- Strategy includes methods to accomplish objectives
- Strategy is an important part of the plan for military action

*{Instructor Note: The following is an extended example of objectives and strategy. By this point in the lesson, you may not have time for this extended example. If so, skip to the next Instructor Note (on the next page).}*

(INTERNAL TRANSITION): YOU MAY NOT REALIZE IT, BUT ALL OF US ROUTINELY APPLY STRATEGY. LET'S LOOK AT AN OBJECTIVE MOST OF US HAVE SHARED. MOST OF YOU/ALL OF YOU ONCE SET THE OBJECTIVE TO BECOME AN AIR FORCE OFFICER.

**LOQ: WHAT'S A STRATEGY FOR MEETING THAT OBJECTIVE?**

**AR:**

- To complete a commissioning program

**FUQ: OUR STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO COMPLETE A COMMISSIONING PROGRAM. WHAT ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF HOW WE COULD ACCOMPLISH THIS?**

**AR:**

- Through the Air Force Academy, ROTC, Officer Training School, AMS (for the Reserves), or direct commissioning

As you can see, many different strategies may be used to meet a goal. Let's focus on ROTC. Before you can receive a commission from ROTC, there are other objectives that must be accomplished.

**FUQ: WHAT ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF THESE?**

**AR:**

- Potential candidates must graduate from high school, first
- Candidates must get accepted to a school that has ROTC programs available
- Candidates must enroll in ROTC

I hope this example clarified the relationship between objectives and strategy.

*{Instructor Note: This is the end of the extended example.}*

**FUQ: BEFORE WE DO THE EXERCISE, ONE LAST THING I'D LIKE TO EXAMINE IS HOW MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY EVOLVE FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEVEL TO THE BATTLEFIELD LEVEL. WOULD SOMEBODY PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THAT WORKS?**

*{Instructor Note: Use the Z-diagram poster displayed in the classroom to teach this point. The z-diagram looks like the illustration in Figure 1, which also appears in the Student Reader. Note: This is **not** a slide in the PowerPoint presentation.}*




Figure 1. Z-diagram

**AR:**

- Our national objectives and strategies originate at the highest levels of the United States government and are eventually transmitted down to specific battlefields
- The higher the level of the particular objective or strategy in question, the broader it is expressed; the lower the level, the more specific it becomes
- Ideally, lower-level objectives and strategies develop directly from higher levels
- The **highest level** of objective and strategy is the **strategic level**, or “national” level
  - The President, assisted by the National Security Council (NSC), develops our overarching national objectives
  - The President and the NSC then develop strategies to attain those national objectives. Both our core national objectives and strategies are described in the National Security Strategy (NSS) document
- For the military, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) develops **strategic- (or “national-”) level** military objectives. The Chairman bases these objectives on the goals set for the military by the President in the NSS. The Chairman (with help from the Joint Chiefs) also develops national-level strategies for the military. Both the military’s objectives and its strategies are presented in the National Military Strategy (NMS) document. Again, the NMS describes military concepts, tasks, and capabilities required to achieve the goals established by the President in the NSS

- Next, below the strategic level, is the **theater/operational level**. At this level, the military's Combatant Commanders use the NMS (and other guidance from the CJCS) to develop and orchestrate **objectives** for entire theaters (for example, Bosnia, the Pacific, or Korea). The Combatant Commanders then devise **strategies** for employ forces within that theater. A theater is generally a geographical area. If hostilities break out, these objectives and strategies become military campaign objectives and strategies
- Next is the battlefield or "**tactical**" level--this is where new officers will most likely be involved. At this level, the military forces develop tactical objectives and strategies based on the Combatant Commander's campaign strategies. Battlefield strategies (also called "tactics") are very specific

### INTERIM SUMMARY (Instructor Note):

1. Include students' ideas that support main points.
2. Add new information as necessary.
3. Reinforce key elements that will be needed throughout the lesson.

(TRANSITION): NOW THAT WE'VE DISCUSSED THEORY, DOCTRINE, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGY, LET'S RUN THROUGH AN EXERCISE.

**f. MP V: Exercise: 0:10 (0:55)**

[SLIDE]




*{Instructor Note: Hand out a copy of A3010-HO-1, "Theory, Doctrine, Objectives, and Strategy Exercise," to each student. Allow them enough time [probably no more than 5 minutes] to complete the exercise. Have students complete the exercise individually, then review the exercise as a group and discuss. Have students explain why they chose their answers. Be sure they understand the definitions of theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy. For your reference, your Answer Key to the exercise is A3010-Atch 1-1.}*

(TRANSITION): LET'S WRAP UP THIS LESSON WITH A REVIEW OF WHAT WE'VE COVERED.

**g. Conclusion:** 0:05 (1:00)

[SLIDE]



1) //Summary//

Today we've discussed theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy. We began by discussing contextual elements and operational art elements. Then we defined theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy. Along the way, we discussed why theories change, and how objectives and strategies are transmitted from the strategic level down to the tactical level. We also went through an exercise to help clarify the differences between theory, doctrine, objectives, and strategy.

2) //Remotivation//

It's unlikely that any of us will be publishing doctrine any time soon, but as officers, it's important to understand how theories, doctrine, objectives, and strategies are created and developed. After all, ABC's overview of aerospace history, theory, and doctrine begins in A3020, Origin and Theory of Airpower. You can use ABC's aerospace history lessons as reference points to illustrate how military theory is based on historical experience and analysis. This lesson taught you that concept. As you study and analyze aerospace history at ABC--and throughout your career--you will actually be participating in the process of developing future military theories and doctrine. Now you should understand that the Air Force's future strategies can begin with your studies, right here!

3) //Closure//

As Frederick the Great said, "War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well."

## Theory, Doctrine, Objectives, and Strategy Exercise

**Read the four items below. One of them represents theory, one doctrine, one objectives, and one strategy. In the column on the left, write down whether you think each item is an example of theory, doctrine, objectives or strategy. Be prepared to defend your rationale.**

- |             |   |
|-------------|---|
| 1.<br>_____ | 1. All military Services provide strike capabilities, but the ability of the Air Force to attack rapidly and persistently with a wide range of munitions anywhere on the globe at any time is unique. . . . The decline of both total force structure and worldwide bases has decreased the size of our forward presence and forced the US military to become primarily an expeditionary force. The Air Force, with its growing space force, its intercontinental ballistic missiles, and its fleet of multirole bombers and attack aircraft supported by a large tanker fleet, is ideally suited to such operations.   |
| 2.<br>_____ | 2. The F-117s employed in Desert Storm did not require the large support packages of other non-stealthy aircraft. Furthermore, as Eliot Cohen and Thomas Keaney have noted, the F-117 provided “stealth” to a much larger portion of the coalition’s air force by disabling the Iraqi air defense system, thereby making subsequent raids harder to detect and counter. While not all adversaries will have sophisticated integrated air defense systems, pursuit of stealth and low observability technologies will pay dividends through increased efficiency and reduced losses.   |
| 3.<br>_____ | 3. . . . Instant Thunder (the name for Colonel John Warden’s plan for Desert Storm) would realize these objectives through a violent but controlled strategic air campaign directed at the nerve centers of Iraqi national power. Coalition forces would attack critical elements (e.g., communications, electricity, distribution of petroleum products, etc.) to convince the Iraqi leadership and/or citizenry that holding Kuwait was more expensive than releasing it. At the same time, they would destroy the elements of key production and national infrastructure (e.g., facilities for nuclear, biological and chemical [NBC] weapons research and production) that supported Iraq’s attempt to produce weapons of mass destruction. . . . Further, coalition forces would mount psychological operations (PSYOPS--e.g., leaflet drops, attacks against monuments that were part of Hussein’s “personality cult,” etc.) to convince the Iraqi people to remove Saddam Hussein. |
| 4.<br>_____ | 4. Immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; Kuwait’s legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime; committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf; Protect the lives of American citizens abroad.  |



## Theory, Doctrine, Objectives, and Strategy Exercise (Answer Key)

**Read the four items below. One of them represents theory, one doctrine, one objectives, and one strategy. In the column on the left, write down whether you think each item is an example of theory, doctrine, objectives or strategy. Be prepared to defend your rationale.**

### 1. DOCTRINE

Rationale: This statement comes directly from AFDD 1, page 32. It represents Air Force “sanctioned beliefs.”

1. All military Services provide strike capabilities, but the ability of the Air Force to attack rapidly and persistently with a wide range of munitions anywhere on the globe at any time is unique. The decline of both total force structure and worldwide bases has decreased the size of our forward presence and forced the US military to become primarily an expeditionary force. The Air Force, with its growing space force, its intercontinental ballistic missiles, and its fleet of multirole bombers and attack aircraft supported by a large tanker fleet, is ideally suited to such operations. (Source: AFDD 1)

### 2. THEORY

Rationale: This statement reports and analyzes a historical anecdote. The author further *theorizes* about future implications, based on the anecdote.

2. The F-117s employed in Desert Storm did not require the large support packages of other non-stealthy aircraft. Furthermore, as Eliot Cohen and Thomas Keaney have noted, the F-117 provided “stealth” to a much larger portion of the coalition’s air force by disabling the Iraqi air defense system, thereby making subsequent raids harder to detect and counter. While not all adversaries will have sophisticated integrated air defense systems, pursuit of stealth and low observability technologies will pay dividends through increased efficiency and reduced losses.  
(Source: Conversino, Mark J. “The Changed Nature of Strategic Air Attack.” Parameters (Winter 1997-98): 28-41.)

### 3. STRATEGY

Rationale: The paragraph describes *how* Col Warden planned to meet objectives.

3. . . . Instant Thunder (the name for Colonel John Warden’s plan for Desert Storm) would realize these objectives through a violent but controlled strategic air campaign directed at the nerve centers of Iraqi national power. Coalition forces would attack critical elements (e.g., communications, electricity, distribution of petroleum products, etc.) to convince the Iraqi leadership and/or citizenry that holding Kuwait was more expensive than releasing it. At the same time, they would destroy the elements of key production and national infrastructure (e.g., facilities for nuclear, biological and chemical [NBC] weapons research and production) that supported Iraq’s attempt to produce weapons of mass destruction. . . . Further, coalition forces would mount psychological operations (PSYOPS--e.g., leaflet drops, attacks against monuments that were part of Hussein’s “personality cult,” etc.) to convince the Iraqi people to remove Saddam Hussein.  
(Source: Mann, Edward C., III. Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates. AU Press: Maxwell AFB, AL, 1995. 37.)

### 4. OBJECTIVES

Rationale: The statements reflect *what* the United States intended to achieve in the conflict with Iraq.

4. Immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; Kuwait’s legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime; committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf; Protect the lives of American citizens abroad.  
(Source: “Instant Thunder: A Strategic Air Campaign Proposal for CINCENT.” Briefing. Desert Story Collection: 10 August 1990, File 1. US Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.)